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Macroeconomics has changed in light of both developments in the world and
its internal intellectual evolution. This Article explores ways in which legal
scholarship can help inform macroeconomic research and macroeconomic
policymaking in light of three important developments: (i) limitations on
conventional monetary policy in a world with lower equilibrium interest rates;
(ii) labor markets not clearing as evidenced by persistent declines in labor
force participation; and (iii) the potential for microeconomic competition
policies to have major macroeconomic effects.
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Introduction
The field of law and macroeconomics is emerging at a critical time.] The
macroeconomy-and the field of macroeconomics-faces a number of
challenges. Some of these challenges are grounded in changes in the economy
itself, while others are grounded in changes in our understanding of the
economy. In all cases, lawyers have a potentially important role in helping to
shape our understanding of macroeconomics. Even absent these changes,
lawyers play a significant role-central in many cases-in developing
economic policy. For this reason alone, the increased engagement with
macroeconomics by lawyers is welcome.
Textbook models traditionally have been based on three premises about
the functioning of the macroeconomy:
(1) The Federal Reserve decides the number of jobs, so the rest of us can
ignore the macroeconomy. Moreover, business cycles themselves do not
have long-run consequences.
(2) Outside of recessions, the labor market clears.
(3) Competition and other micro issues are the domain of microeconomists.
Of course, these are overly stylized descriptions. A number of papers
advanced knowledge by deviating from them-and some of these deviations
are even included in the latest textbooks. Nevertheless, these stylized premises
are a reasonably fair description of economic theory prior to the Great
Recession and provide a useful way to organize the latest developments in
economic thinking.
Today, some of the most exciting developments in both economics and
law and macroeconomics-and some of the work that is most urgently needed
going forward-come in the ways that these propositions are, or are not, an
accurate representation of current economic realities. So let me take these ideas
in turn, restating affirmatively the situation we find ourselves in today.
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I. Proposition 1: In Many Circumstances Monetary Policy May Be Limited,
Potentially Changing the Way We Think About the Role of Fiscal Policy,
Regulation, and Other Policies in Macroeconomic Stabilization
The reduction in interest rates over the previous decades has left less
scope for conventional monetary policy, leading to a shift in how economists
think about discretionary fiscal policy-as well as opening up the role of
macroeconomic analysis in more settings.
A. The Decline in Interest Rates and Conventional Monetary Policy
The Federal Reserve combatted previous recessions with large interest
rate cuts, with an average reduction of 630 basis points since the 1957 recession
as shown in Figure 1.














In 2000, David Reifschneider and John Williams estimated that the zero
lower bound would be constraining about five percent of the time in the United
States, with a mean duration of four quarters when rates hit the zero lower
2. The data was obtained from the Federal Reserve and the author's calculations. Note
that bars represent the difference between peak effective Federal funds rate prior to or during recession
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bound, as shown in Figure 2A.3 However, the experience in the United States
since the paper was published suggests that, if anything, this estimate was
overoptimistic-with the zero lower bound binding over forty percent of the
time as shown in Figure 2B.
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3. David Reifschneider & John C. Williams, Three Lessons for Monetary Policy in a
Low-Inflation Era, 32 J. MONEY, CREDIT & BANKING 936 (2000).
4. Id. Note that * indicates values between 0 and 0.5.
5. The data was obtained from the Federal Reserve and the author's calculations. Note
that * indicates values between 0 and 0.5.
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As the authors clearly stated at the time, a key assumption in this result
was that the equilibrium real federal funds rate was 2.5 percent, the consensus
view at the time. This is well above the most recent projections from the
members of the Federal Open Market Committee, which range from 0.3 to 1.5
percent for the long-run real federal funds rate. Consequently, it is reasonable
to assume that the zero lower bound or effective lower bound will constrain
conventional monetary policy much more than five percent of the time in the
future.6
Part of the reason for the large deviation from the widely held expectation
that the effective lower bound would be reached in short and rare circumstances
was that people put a low probability on a recession as deep as the Great
Recession. That such an event happens once or twice a century might be a
reasonable assumption for policy going forward. But the other part of the
reason that the effective lower bound has been much more binding than
expected is a general reduction in equilibrium interest rates that was evident
even before the Great Recession. Assuming that this general reduction in
interest rates would go away in the future would not be a reasonable
assumption.
6. See Marc Dordal-i-Carreras et al., Infrequent but Long-Lived Zero-Bound Episodes
and the Optimal Rate ofInflation, 8 ANN. REV. ECON. 497 (2016). Changes to monetary policy rules
could affect the frequency with which the effective lower bound is binding. See Marvin Goodfriend, The
Case for Unencumbering Interest Rate Policy at the Zero Bound (Fed. Reserve Bank of Kansas City
Econ. Policy Symposium - Jackson Hole, 2016),
http://www.kansascityfed.org/%7E/media/files/publicat/sympos/2016/econsymposium-goodfriend-
paper.pdf; John C. Williams, Monetary Policy in a Low R-Star World (Fed. Reserve Bank of S.F.,
Economic Letter No. 2016-23, Aug. 15, 2016), http://www.frbsf.org/economic-research/files/el2016-
23.pdf. This discussion assumes either that those changes will not be made or that they have costs that
need to be balanced against the alternatives discussed here.
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Figure 3: Real Ten-Year Benchmark Rate7
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The reduction in real interest rates has occurred across all of the advanced
economies and was well underway prior to the crisis itself, as shown in Figure
3. A range of explanations have been advanced for this decline in interest rates.
These include increased global savings, le s global demand for investment, and
a paucity of safe assets as well as shifting demographics and changes in
potential output or productivity growth, with some of these developments
associated with what has been termed "secular stagnation." Regardless of the
cause, the sustained and widespread decline of real interest rates indicates that
even as rates have partly rebounded from their post-crisis lows they are
unlikely to return to the levels expected prior to the crisis.9
7. The data was obtained from national sources via Haver Analytics, and the author's
calculations. Note that inflation is measured by one-year changes in the core consumer price index.
8. See SECULAR STAGNATION: FACTS, CAUSES, AND CURES (Coen Teulings and
Richard Baldwin eds., 2014); Lawrence H. Summers, U.S. Economic Prospects: Secular Stagnation,
Hysteresis, and the Zero Lower Bound, 49 Bus. ECON., April 2014, at 65.
9. See COUNCIL OF ECON. ADVISERS, LONG-TERM INTEREST RATES: A SURVEY
(2015), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/docs/interestrate-report final v2.pdf;




Moreover, this decline has been compounded by a reduction in expected
inflation across the advanced economies as shown in Figure 4. This has been
the result of the widespread adoption of two percent inflation targets, beginning
with New Zealand in 1990, followed by most advanced economies, including
the United States, where the Federal Reserve formally adopted the target in
2012.10 In general, advanced economy central banks have been increasingly
credible about their targets and, if anything, have proven more unable to raise
inflation up to the target than vice versa.
Figure 4: Long-Term Inflation Forecast in G-7 Countries: 6-10 Years
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(Fed. Reserve Bank of S.F., Working Paper No. 2016-11, Dec. 2016), http://www.frbsf org/economic-
research/files/wp2016-l .pdf. The stronger form of secular stagnation argues that with low inflation,
real interest rates cannot fall low enough to restore aggregate demand as a result of the effective lower
bound, leading to a self-reinforcing spiral of weak economic performance and low interest rates. While I
do not believe the stronger form of secular stagnation is a correct description of the United States or
Europe, the weaker form-that conventional monetary policy will be constrained more often in the
future-is certainly a source of concern. Jason Furman, Chairman, Council of Econ. Advisers, The
Global Economy: Demand, Supply, and Interdependence, Remarks at Globes Israel Business
Conference (Dec. 7, 2014).
10. Why the Fed Targets 2% Inflation, ECONOMIST (Sept. 13, 2015),
http://www.economist.com/blogs/economist-explains/2015/09/economist-explains-7.
11. The data was obtained from the Consensus Forecast.
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Nominal interest rates, which are the sum of real interest rates and
inflation, have fallen sharply as both real interest rates and inflation have come
down. Forecasters consistently missed this fall in nominal interest rates. While
forecasts of variables like GDP growth have generally been unbiased, the errors
in interest rate forecasts have almost all been in a single direction-reflecting
the incorrect assumption that they would revert to historic values as shown in
Figure 5. Today, forecasters and market prices still assume that interest rates
increase but they also assume that this reversion will be to a lower value than
hitherto had been the case.
Figure 5: Ten-Year Treasury Rates and Historical Economist Forecasts12
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B. Consequences of Constrained Monetary Policy
Based on historical experience, monetary policymakers would like to be
able to cut the federal funds rate by about 600 basis points in recessions. But it
12. The data was obtained from the Federal Reserve Board, Office of Management and




is possible and maybe even likely that cutting rates by more than about 300
basis points will be impossible in many future recessions. This constraint on
monetary policy does not just risk exacerbating future recessions, it could have
longer-run economic consequences as well. There is substantial evidence that
output exhibits a unit root, that is a loss today will not be made up in the future
and thus will be persistent. That is consistent with the observation that
following the recessions of the early 1980s and the Great Recession the level of
output never returned to its previous path.14 Moreover, even more concerning,
is the possibility that deep recessions could reduce the growth rate of future
output by reducing investments, especially in research and development.'5
The implications of all of this-that anything that affects the economy in
the short-run may also have long-run effects-heightens the importance of
finding potential complements to monetary stabilization.
C. Implications for Fiscal Policy
The changes in interest rates have given rise to what I have termed the
"New View" of fiscal policy, although in many ways it is really the resurrection
of the old view.16 This view has five tenets: (i) fiscal policy is a necessary
complement to monetary policy; (ii) fiscal policy can be very effective and may
have positive side effects like crowding in investment and raising the
equilibrium interest rate; (iii) fiscal space is larger than generally appreciated;
(iv) more sustained stimulus, especially if it increases aggregate supply, may be
warranted; and (v) there can be large benefits to coordinated action across
countries.
I will discuss these in turn.
1. Fiscal policy is a necessary complement to monetary policy. The
equilibrium level of the nominal interest rate is what is relevant for
understanding the scope of monetary policy in the future. To the degree rates
have an effective lower bound-because people can always substitute into
cash, which has a zero interest rate-then a lower nominal interest rate means
13. See John Y. Campbell & N. Gregory Mankiw, Are Output Fluctuations
Transitory?, 102 Q.J. ECON. 857 (1987); Charles R. Nelson & Charles R. Plosser, Trends and Random
Walks in Macroeconomic Time Series: Some Evidence and Implications, 10 J. MONETARY ECON. 139
(1988).
14. Laurence Ball, Long-Term Damage from the Great Recession in OECD Countries,
II EUROPEAN J. ECON. & ECON. POLICIES: INTERVENTION 149 (2014); Carmen M. Reinhart & Kenneth
S. Rogoff, The Aftermath ofFinancial Crises, 99 AM. ECON. REV. 466 (2009).
15. Gustavo Adler et al., Gone with the Headwinds: Global Productivity (IMF Staff
Discussion Note, 2017), http://www.imf.org/~/media/Files/Publications/SDN/2017/sdn I 704.pdf.
16. Jason Furman, Chairman, Council of Econ. Advisers, The New View of Fiscal
Policy and Its Applications, Speech at Global Implications of Europe's Redesign Conference (Oct. 5,
2016).
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less scope for conventional monetary policy to reduce rates in recessions. And
while unconventional monetary policy can still operate, there is substantial
controversy on its efficacy and side effects-making other, complementary
efforts to achieve the same goals desirable. Fiscal policy is the most direct and
quantitatively large alternative to monetary policy for achieving
macroeconomic goals.
2. Fiscal policy can be very effective and may even have positive side
effects like crowding in investment and raising the equilibrium interest
rate. In the immediate postwar decades, economists broadly supported fiscal
stimulus.17 But much of modern academic macroeconomics has ranged from
dismissive of any effect of fiscal policy on the macroeconomy, to arguments
that imply that additional debt can reduce confidence and hurt the economy,19
to arguments that consolidations can actually be expansionary.20
However, an increasing body of evidence, pulled from both historical and
recent data, has found that fiscal expansion can have large positive effects. On
the revenue side, Romer and Romer examine exogenous tax changes in the
United States since World War II and find resulting multipliers as high as
21three. On the spending side, studies that focus on historical exogenous
(unpredicted) changes in U.S. government expenditure find output multipliers
22ranging from 0.6 to 1.2. Studies based on federal defense spending associated
with the Recovery Act detect multipliers over one in some scenarios.23
Consumer-level microeconomic data from the 2001 and 2008 U.S. tax credits
show evidence that liquidity-constrained households spent a sizable fraction of
that rebate.24
17. See, e.g., Alan S. Blinder & Robert M. Solow, Does Fiscal Policy Matter?, 2 J.
PUB. ECON. 319 (1973).
18. See, e.g., Robert J. Barro, Are Government Bonds Net Wealth?, 82 J. POL. ECON.
1095 (1974).
19. See, e.g., Laurence Ball & N. Gregory Mankiw, What Do Budget Deficits Do? (Fed.
Reserve Bank of Kansas City Econ. Policy Symposium - Jackson Hole, 1995),
http://www.kansascityfed.org/publicat/sympos/1995/pdf/%2Os95manki.pdf.
20. See, e.g., ALAN S. BLINDER & JANET L. YELLEN, THE FABULOUS DECADE:
MACROECONOMIC LESSONS FROM THE 1990s (2001); Alberto Alesina & Silvia Ardagna, Large
Changes in Fiscal Policy: Taxes Versus Spending, 24 TAX POL'Y & ECON. 35 (2010).
21. Christina D. Romer & David H. Romer, The Macroeconomic Effects of Tax
Changes: Estimates Based on a New Measure ofFiscal Shocks, 100 AM. ECON. REV. 763 (2010).
22. Olivier Blanchard & Roberto Perotti, An Empirical Characterization of the
Dynamic Effects of Changes in Government Spending and Taxes on Output, 117 Q.J. ECON. 1329
(2002); Valerie A. Ramey, Can Government Purchases Stimulate the Economy?, 49 J. ECON.
LITERATURE 673 (2011); Valerie A. Ramey & Matthew D. Shapiro, Costly Capital Reallocation and the
Effects of Government Spending, 48 CARNEGIE-ROCHESTER CONF. SERIES ON PUB. POL'Y 145 (1998).
23. Emi Nakamura & J6n Steinsson, Fiscal Stimulus in a Monetary Union: Evidence
from U.S. Regions, 104 AM. ECON. REV. 753 (2014).
24. Jonathan A. Parker et al., Consumer Spending and the Economic Stimulus Payments




When monetary policy is constrained, fiscal policy may be effective
because monetary policy will not partially offset fiscal policy through interest-
rate or exchange-rate channels. Fiscal policy could even crowd in additional
private investment through its ability to stimulate growth and raise inflation
expectations, thereby lowering interest rates.25 However, the design of fiscal
policy is critical. Many tax expenditures, like the exclusion of employer-
sponsored health insurance or the mortgage interest deduction, are procyclical,
which can have the effect of exacerbating the business cycle.26 The reaction
function of monetary policy is also important, as some have argued that a
monetary authority that reverts to a Taylor-type rule during fiscal expansion
will significantly reduce fiscal multipliers.27
3. Fiscal space is larger than generally appreciated. Arguments against
fiscal stimulus have increasingly focused on the issue of fiscal space, stemming
in part from an idea that irresponsible government spending caused Europe's
sovereign debt crisis. However, there is no correlation between countries whose
debt-to-GDP ratio rose prior to the crisis and those that saw their sovereign
spreads spike during 2011; instead the spikes in debt in places like Ireland and
Spain were a result of the crisis rather than a cause of it.28
The tendency today is toward excessive caution in the name of fiscal
responsibility, when, in fact, growth associated with fiscal stimulus can
improve fiscal sustainability. Effective fiscal stimulus may raise output faster
than debt, reducing the debt-to-GDP ratio.29 Changes in the debt-to-GDP ratio
depend on two factors: (i) the difference between interest rates and the growth
rate (strictly speaking, r minus g multiplied by the debt-to-GDP ratio); and (ii)
the primary balance (the difference between revenue and non-interest
spending). The larger the debt, the more the effect of changes in r - g dwarfs
25. Lawrence Christiano et al., When Is the Government Spending Multiplier Large?,
119 J. POL. ECON. 78 (2011); Robert E. Hall, By How Much Does GDP Rise if the Government Buys
More Output?, 2009 BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECON. ACTIvITY 183 (2009); Michael Woodford, Simple
Analytics of the Government Expenditure Multiplier, 3 AM. ECON. J.: MACROECONOMICS 1 (2011).
26. Yair Listokin, Equity, Efficiency, and Stability: The Importance ofMacroeconomics
for Evaluating Income Tax Policy, 29 YALE J. ON REG. 45 (2012).
27. See, e.g., Woodford, supra note 25.
28. Jay C. Shambaugh, The Euro's Three Crises, 2012 BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECON.
ACTIVITY 157 (2012).
29. Alan J. Auerbach & Yuriy Gorodnichencko, Fiscal Stimulus and Fiscal
Sustainability (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Res., Working Paper No. 23789, 2017),
http://www.nber.org/papers/w23789; J. Bradford Delong & Lawrence H. Summers, Fiscal Policy in a
Depressed Economy, 2012 BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECON. ACTIVITY 233 (2012); Vitor Gaspar et al.,
Macroeconomic Management When Policy Space Is Constrained: A Comprehensive, Consistent and
Coordinated Approach to Economic Policy (IMF Staff Discussion Note, 2016),
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/sdn/2016/sdnl609.pdf; Organisation for Economic Co-operation
and Development, Chapter 2: Using the Fiscal Levers to Escape the Low-Growth Trap, in OECD
ECONOMIC OUTLOOK: VOLUME 2016 ISSUE 2 (2016), http://www.oecd.org/eco/public-finance/Using-
the-fiscal-levers-to-escape-the-low-growth-trap.pdf.
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the effect of the primary balance in determining debt dynamics. So policies that
raise g without triggering concerns that raise r can be especially effective in
improving sustainability.30
This argument seems to be consistent with financial market perceptions.
For example, downgrades to many European sovereign debt ratings in the last
eight years have come with warnings of growth prospects, not of spending
irresponsibility. And, in the United States, nominal growth, not fiscal
consolidation, has been critical for establishing debt sustainability.31
Even to the degree that stimulus adds to the debt, ideas of optimal debt
levels need to consider reduced future liabilities and persistently lower interest
rates. For example, nearly three-quarters of advanced economies have smaller
expected increases in pension and health spending between 2010 and 2030,
comparing 2016 IMF projections with those from five years prior.32 Moreover,
permanently lowered interest rates increase the threshold of sustainable
government debt.33 Indeed, given low real interest rates, major advanced
economies today have relatively low interest payments as a share of GDP.
4. More sustained stimulus, especially if it increases aggregate supply,
may be warranted. The "New View" of fiscal policy, based on the empirical
and analytical observations above, places more weight on sustained fiscal
policy, especially through effectively allocated investments. Sustained fiscal
policy may be necessary because the global economic climate is showing
symptoms of persistently inadequate demand dragging down growth and
inflation. It can play a critical role not only in demand but also in expanding
productivity and aggregate supply going forward. IMF researchers found that a
permanent increase in government investment of one percent of GDP increases
30. Some have argued that higher growth has only a limited effect on fiscal
sustainability because it automatically leads to higher pensions and greater spending in other areas (for
example, faster growth could raise wages more quickly, increasing the cost of providing government-
funded healthcare). But even for pensions, the elasticity of present-value spending with respect to
growth is considerably less than one- -because of lags in when benefits adjust-and pensions are just a
portion of overall government spending. So only a portion of the additional revenues associated with the
higher growth rate would be offset by the additional spending it triggered.
3 1. George J. Hall & Thomas J. Sargent, Interest Rate Risk and Other Determinants of
Post-WWII U.S. Government Debt/GDP Dynamics, 3 AM. ECON. J.: MACROECONOMICS 192 (2011).
32. IMF, Debt: Use It Wisely, Fiscal Monitor (Oct. 2016),
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/fm/2016/02/pdf/fml602.pdf; IMF, Shifting Gears: Tackling
Challenges on the Road to Fiscal Adjustment, Fiscal Monitor (Apr. 2011),
http://www.imf.org/extemal/pubs/ft/fm/201 1/01/pdf/fml 101 .pdf.
33. Douglas W. Elmendorf & Louise M. Sheiner, Federal Budget Policy with an Aging
Population and Persistently Low Interest Rates, 31 J. ECON. PERSP. 175 (2017). Declines in expected
growth rates lower the optimal stock of government debt. But interest rate expectations have come down
considerably more than growth expectations, consistent with the fact that interest rate forecasts had a
large, systematic upwards bias for several decades while growth forecasts were generally unbiased. In
fact, relative to pre-2000 forecasts, growth rate expectations have generally increased while interest rate




growth through permanently increasing investment and consumption. 34
Furthermore, fiscal spending creates future fiscal space through increasing
government revenue and reducing the debt-to-GDP ratio, as shown in Figures
6A and 6B.
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5. There can be large benefits to coordinated fiscal action across
countries. In a world characterized by inadequate demand and low interest
rates, shocks to demand can spill more swiftly and strongly across borders.37
Normally, a demand contraction in one country will spill into others through
shrinking imports. That country's currency will depreciate, giving their exports
an advantage, and resulting in a current account surplus. The demand shock
affects the other countries, but it need not directly affect output. If monetary
easing is possible, which among other things shifts exchange rates and tempers
the movements of the current account, the other countries can offset the
reduction in demand.
However, at the effective lower bound, monetary policy cannot offset
policies in foreign countries that create large current account surpluses. Thus, a
fiscal contraction abroad spills directly into GDP. Note that the demand shock
from fiscal consolidation has likely been significant in the Eurozone, where the
Single Market makes these spillovers more direct and members cannot rely on
the mitigating effects of exchange rates and monetary policy.
Fiscal expansions can have large positive spillovers, especially when they
are internationally coordinated. A fiscal expansion can increase demand in both
the domestic economy and the economies of its trade partners. To the extent
that business investment has been held back by low GDP growth, a coordinated
expansion could also lift investment, further buoying the world economy.
Gaspar, Obstfeld, and Sahay find that countries or regions engaging in an
individual permanent fiscal expansion worth one percent of GDP face rising
debt levels.38 However, when stimulus is coordinated, additional growth rose in
each region, cumulating to 2.3 percent in additional global growth, while
individual debt-to-GDP ratios fell. This strengthens the case for mutual reliance
on fiscal policy that undergirds, for example, the G-20's inclusion of fiscal
policy as one of three tools for strengthening growth.39
D. Implications for the Discount Rate Used in Regulatory Analysis
Lower equilibrium interest rates and an economy that is likely to spend
more time with rates constrained at the zero lower bound going forward should
also cause a rethink of regulatory policy. One clear implication of the change in
equilibrium interest rates is that our approach to long-run regulatory policy
needs to be updated to reflect lower discount rates. Moreover, some process
37. Gauti B. Eggertsson et al., A Contagious Malady? Open Economy Dimensions of
Secular Stagnation (Nat'1 Bureau of Econ. Res., Working Paper No. 22299, 2016),
http://www.nber.org/papers/w22299.
38. Gaspar et al., supra note 29.
39. G-20 Communiqu6, G-20 Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors Meeting




should be put in place to periodically review and update the discount rate in
light of changing conditions in the economy. OMB Circular A-4 recommends
two discount rates, one reflecting the rate of return to capital, which it
recommends be used for regulations that displace investment, and another
reflecting the social rate of time preference, which is used for regulations that
displace consumption.40 Neither of these rates reflect timeless truths, instead
they account for the fact that regulations can reduce future investment or
consumption. The cost of that displacement is appropriately measured using the
market valuation of future investment or consumption.
OMB circular A-4 was last updated in 2003 and set the social rate of time
preference at three percent, which happened to be about the real rate on 10-year
Treasuries in that year, as shown in Figure 7. Since then, the real 10-year
Treasury rate has fallen to less than one percent. The forecast for the real rate
going forward has also fallen substantially, although not by quite as much as
the rate itself has fallen. The Council of Economic Advisers suggested that the
social rate of time preference should be at most two percent and the rate of
return on capital should likely be reduced as well.41 Moreover, a process should
be put in place to periodically evaluate and update these rates based on market
prices and the latest forecasts-for example, every five to ten years.
40. OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, CIRCULAR A-4, REGULATORY ANALYSIS (Sept. 17
2003).
41. COUNCIL OF ECON. ADVISERS, DISCOUNTING FOR PUBLIC POLICY: THEORY AND
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E. Should Benefit-Cost Analysis Incorporate Macroeconomic Effects?
A more complicated issue is the question of whether benefit-cost analysis
should include macroeconomic effects. Ever since Executive Order 12,291 by
President Ronald Reagan in 1981, benefit-cost analysis largely prevailed in the
regulatory process, especially in the executive agencies and where it has not
been explicitly prohibited by law, as in the case of ozone regulation. The
canonical approach to benefit-cost analysis excludes any analysis of the impact
of regulations on the macroeconomy.43
As Yair Listokin has developed in great detail, excluding macroeconomic
impacts from regulatory analysis is based on the assumption that the economy
is at full employment."4 Students are taught, for example, that if a regulation
creates new jobs for people installing scrubbers, the new jobs are a cost not a
benefit. If the economy is at full employment then the scrubber-installer jobs
will not be net new jobs but instead reflect a shift in employment from some
other sector that, based on previous market choices, would have been a better
use of those resources-not counting the cost of whatever externality is being
regulated.
42. The data was obtained from the Federal Reserve, Bureau of Economic Analysis,
Office of Management and Budget, and the author's calculations. Note that monthly averages of
nominal yields less changes in the price index for personal consumption expenditures (PCE) excluding
food and energy.
43. E.g., EDITH STOKEY & RICHARD ZECKHAUSER, PRIMER FOR POLICY ANALYSIS
(1978); OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, supra note 40.




The fact that the economy can be operating below potential for sustained
periods of time means that this may be the analytically incorrect way of
applying benefit-cost analysis. In the example above, the jobs installing
scrubbers may indeed be net new jobs-shifting people from involuntarily
unemployed to employed, thus constituting a benefit not a cost.
In theory, this opens up new avenues for considering the role of regulation
in macroeconomic policy. In practice, however, I am more skeptical for two
reasons. First, even with perfect knowledge and implementation, regulations
are generally permanent while the macroeconomic impacts are transitory. In
most circumstances these macroeconomic impacts are unlikely to justify a very
different decision than the long-run benefit-cost analysis would have
prescribed.
Second, our knowledge about the employment impact of regulations is
highly imperfect. For example, does requiring the installation of scrubbers
raises costs and thus hurt electricity generation jobs or does it just create jobs in
the installation of scrubbers? Sorting this out is often beyond what economics is
capable of today. This is evidenced by the Obama Administration's attempts to
incorporate them into the rulemaking process. In January 2011, the
Administration issued Executive Order 13,563, which set out a number of
principles on regulation, including pushing for well-developed quantitative
benefit-cost analysis, a process for retrospective review of existing regulation
and noting as a general principle that regulation "must protect public health,
welfare, safety, and our environment while promoting economic growth,
innovation, competitiveness, and job creation."45 This effort to consider the
employment effects of regulation was motivated in part by Masur and Posner,
who have developed a general argument for considering these effects. '
However, they do share some of my skepticism on the role of regulation as a
short-term macroeconomic tool.47
When the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA) sent out
guidance to agency heads on implementation of Executive Order 13,563, it did
not mention measuring employment impacts, and OMB did not amend Circular
A-4 to include methodologies for calculating effects on employment. 48
However, in writing its subsequent 2011 Report to Congress, OIRA attempted
to solicit public comment on methodologies for estimating employment effects,
and promised to "carefully consider" the suggestions made. In general, the
45. Exec. Order No. 13,563, 76 Fed. Reg. 3821 (Jan. 18, 2011) (emphasis added).
46. Jonathan S. Masur & Eric A. Posner, Regulation, Unemployment, and Cost-Benefit
Analysis, 98 VA. L. REV. 579 (2012).
47. Jonathan S. Masur & Eric A. Posner, Should Regulation Be Countercyclical?, 34
YALE J. ON REG. 857 (2017).
48. Memorandum from Cass R. Sunstein, Adm'r, Office of Info. & Regulatory Affairs,
for the Heads of Exec. Dep'ts & Agencies, & of Indep. Reg. Agencies, Executive Order 13,563,
"Improving Regulation and Regulatory Review" (Feb. 2, 2011),
http://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/omb/memoranda/2011/ml -10.pdf.
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comments received were not particularly helpful. Consequently, OIRA has not
insisted on the inclusion of employment effect analysis as part of its regulatory
review-so it has been largely left to agencies' discretion whether or not to
include it in their Regulatory Impact Analyses (RIAs). The closest thing to
guidance OIRA has released is a literature review on the employment effects of
regulation and a set of (very) general principles for employment-effect analysis,
which it first included in its 2011 report and has revised and expanded in each
subsequent year.49
The agency most actively producing jobs estimates of regulations has
been the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). Since 2011, EPA has
included analysis of employment effects in RIAs for a large number of its rules.
(Prior to 2011, they did so only intermittently.) In part, this is because the
Clean Air Act requires the EPA to conduct "continuing evaluations of potential
loss or shifts of employment" resulting from rules issued under its authority.50
(Other statutes, like the Clean Water Act, contain similar language.)51 Initially
these jobs estimates were based on a paper by Morgenstern, Pizer, and Shih
which examined four different types of regulations-often far afield from the
actual regulation EPA was considering.52 However, since 2013, the National
Center for Environmental Economics (NCEE) has instructed EPA staff to no
longer use Morgenstern, Pizer, and Shih estimates after replication efforts were
unsuccessful.
Recent RIAs, including those for the final Clean Power Plan (2015), the
Residential Wood Heater New Source Performance Standard (2015), and the
Tier 3 Vehicle Emission and Fuel Standards Program (2014), all use a bottom-
up approach based on data on labor use in the regulated sector(s) and in
abatement-related activities and estimate both supply- and demand-side
impacts. 53 These estimates produce jobs numbers that are essentially
proportional to the cost of the regulation-making them at best a noisy estimate
and at worst misleading for the majority of the time when monetary policy is
not constrained by the zero lower bound and the net job impact of any
regulation, like other microeconomic policies, should be thought of as
49. OFFICE OF INFO & REGULATORY AFFAIRS, OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEC.
OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, 2011 REPORT TO CONGRESS ON THE BENEFITS AND COSTS OF FEDERAL
REGULATIONS AND UNFUNDED MANDATES ON STATE, LOCAL, AND TRIBAL ENTITIES (2011),
http://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/omb/inforeg/2011_cb/20 11 _cba report.pdf.
50. 42 U.S.C. § 7621 (2012).
51. 33 U.S.C. § 1367 (2012).
52. Richard Morgenstern et al., Jobs Versus the Environment: An Industry-Level
Perspective, 43 J. ENVTL. ECON. & MGMT. 412 (2002).
53. EPA, EPA-452/R-15-003, REGULATORY IMPACT ANALYSIS FOR THE CLEAN
POWER PLAN FINAL RULE; EPA, EPA-452/R-15-001, REGULATORY IMPACT ANALYSIS FOR
RESIDENTIAL WOOD HEATERS NSPS REVISION (2015); EPA, EPA-420-R-14-005, CONTROL OF AIR
POLLUTION FROM MOTOR VEHICLES: TIER 3 MOTOR VEHICLE EMISSION AND FUEL STANDARDS FINAL




effectively zero because the Federal Reserve will offset any macroeconomic
impact.
None of this is to say that further analytic work on jobs estimates and
legal work to understand the impact of regulations would not be useful-they
absolutely would be. But it is more likely that macroeconomic considerations
would affect the design of the phase-in of regulations rather than long-run
regulations themselves. For example, when the economy is at full employment
it might make sense to have a longer period to phase in a regulation that would
result in the premature obsolescence of the capital stock. Whereas when
monetary policy is at the effective lower bound, a faster phase-in of such a
regulation might have positive macroeconomic side effects by putting more
resources back into productive use.
Finally, even if our knowledge were perfect, there is the political
uncertainty around the question of whether we would actually use it. In a
country like China, for example, much of regulatory and other policy is
subordinated to the short-run goal of hitting the growth target. This affects, for
example, how banks are encouraged to lend and environmental regulations are
enforced. Clearly this is an extreme example but it illustrates pitfall of blindly
following macroeconomic targets rather than benefit-cost analysis. In the
United States, some have advocated that the regulatory agenda be judged by its
impact on the rate of economic growth, which would effectively be dropping
the benefit side of benefit-cost analysis and mismeasuring the costs. Other
political considerations could also more easily enter into the process of
regulatory decision making.
A number of authors have raised a range of other issues where law and
macroeconomics could shift our thinking, including judicial decisions in
bankruptcy proceedings and the law more generally.54 These are all worth
pursing further and I would propose a two-part test for their application. First,
how much of the policy is limited to certain short-run situations versus how
generally applicable it is? For example, a regulation that requires people to dig
a large hole and fill it in might pass a benefit-cost test in a very severe recession
but would be unlikely to be good policy in normal times. Given that we are not
in a recession most of the time, this policy would be unlikely to make sense as
a permanent policy. It is possible, of course, to adopt regulatory fine-tuning-
for example, the regulation could require people to dig holes and refill them
whenever the unemployment rate rose above ten percent. But such triggers and
fine tuning are hard enough in monetary and fiscal policy that the risks of
misapplication would be substantial.
54. See, e.g., Listokin supra note 1; Zachary Liscow, Counter-Cyclical Bankruptcy
Law: An Efficiency Argument for Employment-Preserving Bankruptcy Rules, 116 COLUM. L. REv. 1461
(2016).
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The second part of the test asks how advanced our economic
understanding of the macroeconomic effects of any given microeconomic
policy is. In the case of environmental regulations, for example, I do not think
the current literature allows meaningful predictions about job effects in normal
economic times, let alone predictions that are contingent on the state of the
macroeconomy. As a result, even if such considerations are important, a
Bayesian would give them relatively little weight as compared with the still
difficult, but much more tractable, long-run benefit and cost questions that are
done as part of the canonical analysis.
One particularly fruitful and potentially quantitatively large area for
further implementation that requires both law and economics would be the
handling of mortgage debt in situations of widespread house price declines or
deep recessions, either through mortgage insurance or equity contracts for
houses. s5 Such a change would potentially make sense not just during
recessions but also in situations of localized house price declines or even
helping households deal with the idiosyncratic risks they face. Moreover,
shifting to more equity-like financing for homes could reduce the major role
that debt plays in propagating recessions. Shifting to alternative financing
instruments for homes has, however, faced a number of obstacles-including
tax, legal, and regulatory-that would benefit from further thought.
II. Proposition 2: Labor Markets Do Not Necessarily Clear
The first proposition examined the economy when it was in a deep
recession-particularly with conventional monetary policy constrained-and
found that the economic effects of fiscal policy, regulation, and other
interventions could be different. The second proposition advances some
evidence for the fact that even in normal times conventional market clearing
may not be the best way to understand markets, especially labor markets.
Traditionally economics assumes that outside of recessions, labor markets
clear. Figure 8 provides support for this belief. For over one hundred years the
unemployment rate has generally been about six percent, cycling above and
below it for temporary periods but always coming back to about the same
place.
55. See ATIF MIAN & AMIR SUFI, HOUSE OF DEBT: How THEY (AND YOU) CAUSED
THE GREAT RECESSION, AND How WE CAN PREVENT IT FROM HAPPENING AGAIN (2014); Mian et al.,
Foreclosures, House Prices, and the Real Economy, 70 J. FIN. 2587 (2015).
56. Caplin et al., Facilitating Shared Appreciation Mortgages To Prevent Housing
Crashes and Affordability Crises, HAMILTON PROJECT, (Sept. 2008),
http://www.hamiltonproject.org/assets/legacy/files/downloads andlinks/Facilitating Shared Appreciat
ion_Mortgages to PreventHousing Crashes and AffordabilityCrises.pdf; ROBERT J. SHILLER,
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The unemployment rate, however, only tells part of the story. The
unemployment rate is the number of people who are actively looking for work
but do not have a job divided by the labor force, which is this same group plus
the employed population. But the labor force participation rate, which is the
fraction of the population that is either in a job or actively looking for one, has
been falling for men since the 1950s and women since about 2000. As a result,
the fraction of men who are employed has fallen steadily-from ninety-six
percent in the mid-1950s to eighty-five percent today in the case of prime-age
men (age 25-54) shown in Figure 9.
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57. The data was obtained from the Census Bureau, National Bureau of Economic
Research, Bureau of Labor Statistics (Current Population Survey), and the author's calculations. Data
prior to 1929 are annual rates for individuals 14 and older. Data from 1929 to 1947 are monthly rates for
individuals 16 and older from the National Bureau of Economic Research. Data from 1948 to 2016 are
monthly rates for individuals 16 and older derived from the Current Population Survey.
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The question is what better reflects the answer to the question of whether
markets are clearing, the unemployment rate or the employment-population
rate? In general, one would favor the unemployment rate because it records the
people who are saying that they actually want jobs. It does not reflect a failure
of the labor market that a seventeen-year-old high school student, forty-year-
old stay-at-home parent, or eighty-year-old retiree does not work. All three may
be making a voluntary choice. The question is whether the decline shown in
Figure 9 reflects a voluntary choice on the part of prime-age men. And all of
the evidence suggests it does not.59 One piece of evidence is that these men are
not more likely to be married to a woman in the labor force, in fact they are less
likely to be married to such a woman, as shown in Figure 10A. A second piece
of evidence is that cash transfers appear to have trended down for this group as
shown in Figure 10B-a small increase in the share receiving Social Security
disability insurance payments has been more than offset by the reduction in the
share receiving other cash transfers-so prime-age men are not simply
withdrawing from the workforce to enjoy welfare.
58. The data was obtained from the Bureau of Labor Statistics (Current Population
Survey), and the author's calculations.
59. See COUNCIL OF ECON. ADVISERS, THE LONG-TERM DECLINE IN PRIME-AGE MALE
LABOR FORCE PARTICIPATION (2016),
http://obamawhitchouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/page/files/20160620_primeage mal lfpcea.pd
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60. The data was obtained from Sarah Flood et al., Integrated Public Use Microdata
Series, Current Population Survey: Version 5.0 [dataset], IPUMS-CPS (2017),
https://doi.org/10.18128/DO30.V5.0 and the author's calculations.
61. Id.
V
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Instead, the decline in the employment of these men appears to reflect a
decline in the demand for less-skilled workers, as manifested in both lower
employment for less educated men as shown in Figure 11 and lower relative
wages for less educated men as documented in the large literature on
inequality.62
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The decline in labor force participation rates has been much larger in the
United States as shown in Figure 12, bringing the labor force participation rates
for prime-age men and women in the United States to among the lowest in the
OECD.
62. See, e.g., David H. Autor, Lawrence F. Katz & Melissa S. Kearney, Trends in U.S.
Wage Inequality: Revising the Revisionists, 90 REV. ECON. & STAT. 300 (2006).
63. The data was obtained from Sarah Flood et al., Integrated Public Use Microdata
Series, Current Population Survey: Version 5.0 [dataset], IPUMS-CPS (2017),
https://doi.org/10.18128/DO30.V5.0 and the author's calculations.
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Figure 12: Change in Prime-Age Male Labor Force Participation Rates Across




These labor force issues have important implications for law and
macroeconomics. First, part of the difference between the labor force
experience of the United States and other advanced economies is the result of
the unique American mass incarceration-which has resulted in a large number
of ex-offenders, who have a much lower chance of getting employment, in the
population. This illustrates the potentially large macroeconomic implications of
decisions about the criminal justice system-implications that should be
-65
considered alongside the human consequences of the system.s
Second, these facts confound our understanding of labor market
regulatory issues. The United States has some of the most flexible labor
markets of any of the advanced economies, as measured by ease of hiring and
-66
firing, the minimum wage, and the extent of unionization.6 But this has not
made it commensurately more likely that U.S. labor markets clear. Better
understanding of the interplay of legal rules and regulations with the
64. The data was obtained from the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and
Development and the author's calculations.
65. Harry J. Holzer et al., Declining Employment Among Young Block Less Educated
Men: The Role ofhncarceration and Child Support, 24 J. POL'Y ANALYSIS & MGMT. 329 (2005); Harry
J. Holzer, Collateral Costs: The Efects of Incorceration on the Employment and Earnings of Young
Workers, in Do PRISONS MAKE US SAFER? THE BENEFITS AND COSTS OF THE PRISON BOOM, (Stephen
Raphael & Michael A. Stoll eds., 2009); Devah Pager, The Mark ofa Criminal Record, 108 AM. J. Soc.
937 (2003).
66. See, e.g., OECD, ECONOMIC POLICY REFORMS 2017: GOING FOR GROWTH (2017)
(showing the United States among the "top" in the OECD in all of these indicators).
733
Yale Journal on Regulation
performance of the labor market-in particular, ways in which flexibility does
and does not help the market clear in an optimal matter-is critical.
As in Proposition 1, the persistent deviations from full employment
highlight the importance of a host of legal and regulatory decisions in affecting
not just the short-run performance of the economy but the long-run level of
employment and well-being of people.
III. Proposition 3: Microeconomic Competition Policies Can Have Large
Macroeconomic Effects
The third proposition is that microeconomic competition policies can have
large macroeconomic effects, including on productivity growth. I am defining
"competition" broadly to encompass not just antitrust but also policies like
occupational licensing and land use restrictions. In addition, I am not arguing
that individual antitrust matters should be settled on macroeconomic grounds.
But instead that in designing general rules or assessing funding levels and
prioritization one cannot just think about the microeconomic impacts in
isolation from the macroeconomic context.
One of the dominant macroeconomic facts of the post-1973 period has
been relatively slow productivity growth, with the exception of the tech boom
from 1995-2005. Understanding the causes of this slowdown and potential
remedies for it is one of the major macroeconomic hallenges of our day.
A. The Reduction in Total Factor Productivity Growth
From a strict accounting perspective, the slowdown in overall productivity
growth is largely accounted for by a slowdown in total factor productivity
growth as shown in Figure 13. This is a measure of the underlying innovation

















B. The Reduction in Business Dynamism
Economists have produced a number of explanations for this slowdown in
productivity growth including a set of "headwinds" facing the economy, the
increased difficulty of developing new ideas, the reduction in aggregate
demand leading to a reduction in aggregate supply, and a slowdown in the
diffusion of ideas.68 One plausible but much debated hypothesis that may
explain at least part of the slowdown in productivity growth is the reduction in
firm and labor market dynamism.69
67. The data was obtained from the Bureau of Labor Statistics (Multifactor
Productivity) and the author's calculations.
68. See DAN ANDREWS, CHIARA CRISCUOLO & PETER N. GAL, FRONTIER FIRMS,
TECHNOLOGY DIFFUSION AND PUBLIC POLICY: MICRO EVIDENCE FROM OECD COUNTRIES (2015);
ROBERT J. GORDON, THE RISE AND FALL OF AMERICAN GROWTH: THE U.S. STANDARD OF LIVING
SINCE THE CIVIL WAR (2016); Nicholas Bloom et al., Are Ideas Getting Harder To Find? (August 1,
2017) (unpublished paper) (on file with Stanford University).
69. See Ryan Decker et al., The Role of Entrepreneurship in US Job Creation and
Economic Dynamism, 28 J. ECON. PERSP. 3 (2014), and Martin Neil Baily et al., Productivity Dynamics
in Manufacturing Plants, in BROOKINGS PAPERS: MICROECONOMICS 1992, for support for this
hypothesis. See Huiyu Li, How Does Business Dynamism Link to Productivity Growth?, FRBSF
ECONOMIC LETTER, (Jan. 9, 2017), http://www.frbsf.org/economic-research/publications/economic-
letter/2017/january/business-dynamism-link-to-productivity-growth, and Chang-Tai Hsieh & Peter J.
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Since the 1980s, young firms (those five years old or less) have been
declining as a share of the economy. In 1982, young firms accounted for about
half of all firms, and one-fifth of total employment. However, these figures fell
to about one-third of firms and one-tenth of total employment in 2014. Much of
this decrease is driven by declining firm dynamism-the entry and exit of
firms. While firm exit has remained relative steady since the late 1970s, the
firm entry rate has decreased significantly as shown in Figure 14.
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A similar reduction has been seen in labor market fluidity, including
declines in job creation, job destruction, workers leaving jobs, changing
occupations or industries, or moving to different places.7'
This reduced fluidity in the economy may be interfering with two
important sources of productivity growth. The first is the reallocation of capital
to newer, more productivity entrants. And the second is the threat of newer
entrants leading incumbent firms to be more productive.
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70. The data was obtained from the Census Bureau (Business Dynamics Statistics) and
the author's calculations.
71. See Raven S. Molloy et al., Understanding Declining Fluidity in the U.S. Labor
Market (Fin. & Econ. Discussion Series Working Paper No. 2016-15, 2016).
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C. Microeconomic Evidence for Reduced Competition
A partial explanation for the decline in firm entry rates may be found in
increased barriers to entry. These barriers to entry can come in the form of
advantages that have accrued to incumbents over time. For example, increased
economies of scale may mean that incumbents experience lower costs than new
firms, making it harder for entrants to compete. Or demand-side network
effects-when a product or service increases in quality, more people use it-
may tip the scale in favor of a single provider. Incumbent advantages may also
result from successful political lobbying, in which incumbent firms have the
resources to lobby for rules that protect them from new entrants.
The increase in concentration in the economy has been documented in
Autor et al., 72Gutidrrez and Philippon,73 and the Council of Economic
Advisers,74 among other places. One very high-level indication of this trend is
that the majority of industries have seen increases in the revenue share enjoyed
by the fifty largest firms between 1997 and 2012 as shown in Table 1. Along
similar lines, The Economist found that in forty-two percent of the roughly nine
hundred industries examined, the top four firms controlled more than a third of
the market in 2012, up from twenty-eight percent of industries in 1997.75
72. See David Autor et al., The Fall ofthe Labor Share and the Rise ofSuperstar Firms
(Nat'1 Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 23396, 2017).
73. See German Guti6rrez & Thomas Philippon, Declining Competition and Investment
in the U.S. (Nat'1 Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 23583, 2017).
74. See COUNCIL OF ECON. ADVISERS, BENEFITS OF COMPETITION AND INDICATORS OF
MARKET POWER (2016),
http://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/page/files/20160502 competition issue brief-u
pdated cea.pdf.
75. See Too Much ofa Good Thing, ECONOMIST, Mar. 26, 2016.
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Table 1: Change in Market Concentration by Sector, 1997-201276
Revenue Earned Revenue Share Percentage Point
Industry by50Largest Earned by50 Change in Revenue
Firms, 2012 Largest Firms, Share Earned by5O
(Billions $) 2012 Largest Firms, 1997-2012
Transportation and Warehousing 307.9 42.1 11.4
Retail Trade 1,555.8 36.9 11.2
Finance and Insurance 1,762.7 48.5 9.9
Wholesale Trade 2,183.1 27.6 7.3
Real Estate Rental and Leasing 121.6 24.9 5.4
Utilities 367.7 69.1 4.6
Educational Services 12.1 22.7 4.2*
Professional,Scientificand Technical Services 278.2 18.8 2.8*
Arts, Entertainment and Recreation 39.5 19.6 2.5*
Administrative/ Support 159.2 23.7 1.6
Health Care and Assistance 350.2 17.2 0.8*
Accommodation and Food Services 149.8 21.2 0.1
Other Services, Non-Public Admin 46.7 10.9 -0.2*
Note: Concentration ratio data is displayed foray North American hndustryClassification System (NAICS) sectos forshich data are avaable
from 997 to 2012.* Indicates that the percentage point change is calculated using only taxable firms in that industry, as as 997 revenue share
data are onlyavailable forthe 50 largest taxable firms and the 50 largest tax-exempt firms as separate cateogores, rather than for all firms
combined. Performing this same calculation using data for onlytaxempt firms results in two additional industries showing a decline in
concentration (Arts, Entertainment and Recreation, and Educational Services), while one shows a sight uptick (Other Services).
Source:Economic Census (1997 and 2012), Census Bureau.
Of course, an increase in revenue concentration at the national industry
level is neither necessary nor sufficient to indicate increases in market power:
the sectors listed here are much larger than the relevant markets, whether in
terms of sub-sectors or geography, and fifty firms is likely well above the
number that would mark an industry as competitive. Nevertheless, it is one of
many metrics used to create a snapshot of the current state of competition in
today's economy.
These broad trends are consistent with a number of industry-specific
studies tracking concentration over longer periods of time. In financial services,
a study found that the loan market share of the top ten banks increased from
about thirty percent in 1980 to about fifty percent in 2010.77 Concentration also
increased in agriculture as evidenced by the fact that between 1972 and 2002,
the share of revenues held by the top four firms increased in eight of nine
agricultural industries tracked in a Congressional Research Service study.78
76. The table is copied from COUNCIL OF ECON. ADVISOR, BENEFITS OF COMPETITION
AND INDICATORS OF MARKET POWER, WHITE HOUSE 4 tbl.1 (May 2, 2016),
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/page/files/20160502_competition issue brief
updated cea.pdf.
77. Dean Corbae & Pablo D'Erasmo, A Quantitative Model of Banking Industry
Dynamics (Nov. 14, 2012) (unpublished manuscript), http://www.frbatlanta.org/-
/media/documents/news/conferences/2012/bankers-unconventional-policies/corbae.pdf
78. See Dennis A. Shields, Congressional Research Service, Report for Congress,




Hospital market concentration has also been increasing, with Gaynor, Ho, and
Town 79 finding that the average Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI), a
commonly used measure of market concentration, increased by about 50
percent to about 3,200, the level associated with just three equal-sized
competitors in a market, from the early 1990s through 2006. Similarly,
wireless providers saw increased concentration, with the Federal
Communications Commission finding that the average HHI in the markets they
examined increased from under 2,500 in 2004 to over 3,000 in 2014.81 Finally,
the micro literature has also documented increasing railroad market
concentration increases between 1985 and 2007.82
While these facts all suggest that concentration has increased, it is also
necessary to consider the causes of that increase in concentration. Our
normative evaluation of the policy implications would differ depending on
whether this increase is the result of greater economies of scale, network
externalities, or the result of artificial barriers to entry. Moreover, even if
increased concentration has "good" causes, like network externalities that yield
widespread benefit when everyone is using the same social network, the greater
concentration may have harmful economic or political side effects as well.
D. Macroeconomic Evidence that Increased Concentration Leads to Higher
Rents
One set of suggestive evidence that the increased concentration reflects
increased market power and greater rents comes from macroeconomic data.
One important macroeconomic fact is the decline in investment since the early
1980s, as shown in Figure 15A. What is striking is that this reduction in
investment has coincided with an increased premium on investments in capital
relative to the safe rate of return as shown in Figure 15B. The juxtaposition of
higher prices with restricted quantities is a telltale sign of monopoly power.
79. See Martin Gaynor, Kate Ho & Robert J. Town, The Industrial Organization of
Health-Care Markets, 53 J. ECoN. LITERATURE 235 (2015).
80. The Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) is a commonly used measure of market
concentration that is created by summing up the squared shares of firms in a market. Higher values of
the HHI indicate higher market concentration; it can be close to zero when a market is comprised of a
large number of firms of small size and reaches a maximum of 10,000 when a market is controlled by a
single firm. Antitrust agencies generally consider markets in which the HHI is between 1,500 and 2,500
to be moderately concentrated, and consider markets in which the HHI is in excess of 2,500 to be highly
concentrated. For more detail, see Herfindahl-Hirschman Index, DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE (July 29,
2015), http://www.justice.gov/atr/herfindahl-hirschman-index.
81. See FED. COMMC'NS COMM'N, DA-15-1487, EIGHTEENTH ANNUAL REPORT AND
ANALYSIS OF COMPETITIVE MARKET CONDITIONS WITH RESPECT TO MOBILE WIRELESS, INCLUDING
COMMERCIAL MOBILE SERVICES (2015).
82. See Marvin E. Prater et al., Rail Competition Changes Since the Staggers Act, 49 J.
TRANSP. RES. F. 111 (2010).
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More careful industry- and firm-level analysis by Gutierrez and Philippon bears
out this explanation of the slowdown in business investment.83
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83. See Gutidrrez & Philippon, supra note 73.
84. The data was obtained from the Bureau of Labor Statistics (National Income and
Product Accounts) and the author's calculations.
85. The data was obtained from the Bureau of Economic Analysis, Federal Reserve,














Other macroeconomic phenomenon, including the increased share of
income going to capital and the increased dispersion of rates of return on
capital, are also consistent with reduced competition.86
E. Implications for Law and Macroeconomics
Much of this evidence has been suggestive. The causes and
macroeconomic consequences of increased concentration are not nearly as well
understood as the decline in interest rates that was discussed in the first
proposition. But the suggestive evidence is strong enough that, at the very least,
scholars should take these macroeconomic links seriously-including the
question of whether they have meaningful implications for policy.
In particular, they could have a bearing on antitrust. The traditional law
and economics approach to antitrust focuses on static issues of surplus, in
particular the impact on consumer prices.87 This has the advantage of being a
well-defined question that can be addressed using well-defined techniques,
though admittedly not techniques that yield unambiguous answers. If the
perspective in this analysis is correct, however, such an approach is missing the
bigger part of the story: how market concentration affects the long-run
trajectory of the economy. These dynamic growth effects do not lend
themselves to widely accepted techniques but ultimately may be much more
important than just the static considerations.
Macroeconomic effects could not be explicitly incorporated into any
specific merger decision. However, to the degree that concentration has
negative macroeconomic effects, a thumb on the scale for greater competition
in ambiguous antitrust cases may be warranted going forward-which would
be the opposite of the defacto practice over the last several decades.
Finally, the competitive approach has bearings beyond just narrow issues
of mergers to broader questions of how to promote competition, including the
strength of intellectual property protections, the ownership of personal data,
and State and local regulatory issues like occupational licensing and land use
restrictions.88
86. See Jason Furman & Peter Orszag, Presentation at Columbia University's "A Just
Society" Centennial Event in Honor of Joseph Stiglitz: A Firm-Level Perspective on the Role of Rents
in the Rise in Inequality (2015),
http://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/page/files/20151016_firmlevelperspective on
role of rents in inequality.pdf.
87. See RICHARD A. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW (2d ed. 2001); ROBERT H. BORK, THE
ANTITRUST PARADOX: A POLICY AT WAR WITH ITSELF (1993).
88. Yuichi Furukawa, The Protection of Intellectual Property Rights and Endogenous
Growth: Is Stronger Always Better?, 31 J. EcoN. DYNAMICS & CONTROL 3644 (2007); Morris M.
Kleiner, Reforming Occupational Licensing Policies, HAMILTON PROJECT,
http://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/THPKleinerDiscPaper final.pdf; Morris M.
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Conclusion
Law and Macroeconomics looks at how rules and regulations can have a
macroeconomic impact. That is more likely today than in the past because, with
a lower equilibrium interest rate, the Federal Reserve will more often be
constrained and thus unable to undo the macroeconomic effects of
microeconomic job changes that result from these rules. But it has also always
been true that labor markets do not clear and that microeconomic issues, like
concentration, have major macroeconomic ramifications. Economists are
moving quickly in many of these areas. Lawyers could play an important role
as well.
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